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The recent shift towards the interdisciplinary study of the human-environment relationship is largely driven by
environmental justice debates. This article will distinguish four types of environmental justice and link them to
questions of neoliberalism and altruism. First, environmental justice seeks to redress inequitable distribution of
environmental burdens to vulnerable groups and economically disadvantaged populations. Second, environmental
justice highlights the developed and developing countries’ unequal exposure to environmental risks and benefits.
Third, temporal environmental justice refers to the issues associated with intergenerational justice or concern for
future generations of humans. In all three cases, environmental justice entails equitable distribution of burdens and
benefits to different nations or social groups. By contrast, ecological justice involves biospheric egalitarianism or
justice between species. This article will focus on ecological justice since the rights of non-human species lags
behind social justice debates and discuss the implications of including biospheric egalitarianism in environmental
justice debates.
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Environmental justice (EJ) refers to equitable distribu-
tion of environmental goods among human populations
as well as between species (Rhodes 2003; Hornborg
2011). EJ is often seen as a condition when members of
disadvantaged, ethnic, minority or other groups suffer
disproportionately at the local, regional or national levels
from environmental risks or hazards. EJ is also evoked in
relation to violations of fundamental human rights as a
result of environmental factors. EJ becomes particularly
salient considering the scarcity of natural resources, or
when group identities are linked to environmental bur-
dens or benefits, or when there is an increased aware-
ness of the dangers that human activities pose to natural
environment (Clayton 2000:460).
David Schlosberg (2007) eschews an a priori hierarchy
of claimants to justice; instead he considers variousCorrespondence: h.kopnina@hhs.nl
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in any medium, provided the original work is pmodels of political deliberation among a plurality of par-
ties, including nonhumans. According to Schlosberg
(2007), the theory and practice of EJ necessarily includes
distributive conceptions of justice, but must also em-
brace notions of justice based in recognition, capabilities,
and participation and relations between human commu-
nities and non-human nature. Schlosberg argues that in-
dividual organisms and natural systems are entitled to a
fair share of essential goods, to recognition as part of an
extended community, to the development and enjoy-
ment of capabilities for what he terms ‘flourishing’, and
to some measure of inclusion in political processes.
Schlosberg considers eco-advocates who would repre-
sent non-humans in democratic assemblies.
Critics have noted however that Schlosberg insuffi-
ciently recognizes the potential for serious conflict
among the various dimensions of and claimants to eco-
logical justice (e.g. Cannavó 2008). This article is written
in support of Schlosberg’s thesis, but also to argue that
the recognition of conflict is essential for advancing both
social and ecological agendas.pen access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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and practical implications of including the rights of non-
human species into EJ. The following sections will ad-
dress the types of EJ and link them to questions of
neoliberalism and altruism. We shall then focus on the
role of ecological justice and discuss implications of
expanding moral boundaries of EJ to include the non-
human species.
Types of environmental justice
The concept of EJ has been classified as four-fold
(Kopnina 2010). The first conception refers to inequitable
distribution of environmental burdens such as hazardous
and polluting industries to vulnerable groups such as eth-
nic minorities or the economically disadvantaged popula-
tions (e.g. Carter 2007). The second conception refers to
the developed and developing countries’ unequal exposure
to environmental risks and benefits, such as the conse-
quences of climate change. This is due in large part to the
fact that the poorest people tend to live in the most pol-
luted environments since in the rural areas of the develop-
ing world, they have been forced onto marginal areas by
the process of enclosure, leading to deforestation, soil
erosion, and agricultural failure (Singer and Evans 2013).
A related concept is environmental racism, which typically
involves placement of economically disadvantaged or
minority communities in proximity to environmentally
degraded environments (Melosi 1995). Environmental ra-
cism includes any policy or practice that negatively affects
the living environment of low-income or ethnically mar-
ginalized communities at a higher rate than affluent com-
munities (Holifield 2001).
The third aspect of EJ is intergenerational justice, is
commonly conceived as justice between present and fu-
ture generations of human beings. Temporal concepts of
EJ a reflect concerns for future generations of humans as
their fate may be uncertain due to the present growth
and consumption patterns. This conception is largely
based on the Brundland report’s famous formulation of
sustainable development as ‘development that meets the
needs of the present generations without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’
(WCED 1987). All three types of EJ entail equitable
spatial and temporal distribution of burdens and benefits
to different nations or social groups (e.g. Elliot 2004).
Fourth, EJ involves the so-called biospheric egalitarianism,
which is concerned with other species independent of their
instrumental value for humans and refers to justice between
human and non-human species (Baxter 2005).
Social vs. ecological justice and the question of
neoliberalism
Different types of EJ are not always complimentary.
West and Carrier (2004) have criticised ‘spectacularlandscapes,’ transformed into high-end tourist destina-
tions, at the expense of local people’s livelihoods. In this
view, conservation is a neo-colonial fortress in which
Western environmentalism is imposed upon traditional
societies. Benjamenson et al (2006) have stated that pres-
ervation of biodiversity at the expense of livelihood se-
curity and poverty alleviation is “ethically problematic”.
Other scholars have asserted that social scientists
themselves are influenced by the dominant neoliberal
ideology of anthropocentrism (Catton and Dunlap 1978;
Callicott 1999; Kopnina 2012c, d; Crist 2012). Also,
while initial culpability for environmental problems can
be attributed to Western neoliberal economy, persist-
ence of these problems cannot be decoupled from the
global rise in population and consumption, both in
‘developed’ and ‘developing’ worlds (Cafaro and Crist
2012). What is than “ethically problematic” is that in
talking about economic development, defenders of hu-
man rights imitate the neoliberal ideology of the domin-
ant political elites.
Neoliberalism is broadly defined as a theory of political
economic practices which proposes that human well-
being can best be advanced by the maximization of
entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional frame-
work characterized by private property rights, individual
liberty, free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005:2) Neo-
liberal ideas also tend to situate environmental concerns
within the logic of economic development, through the
process of accumulation of skills, technologies and mar-
kets targeted at profit maximization.
Critical scholars dispute whether neoliberal and devel-
opment enterprise is adequate in addressing social and
environmental challenges. Hursh and Henderson (2011)
reflect that the dominance of neoliberalism is partially
due to the fact that the power elites benefit from hom-
ogenizing policies propagating the logic of economic
growth.
Capitalist industrial development has forced subsis-
tence agriculturists to live in cities, further removing
them from nature. Merchant (2006) identifies the En-
lightenment as the period when science began to
atomize, objectify and dissect nature, foretelling its even-
tual conception as inert. As more and more cultures are
sliding towards a heightened level of anthropocentrism
under the influence of complex post-industrial condi-
tions, “with the animals in our laps and our mechanized
slaughterhouses, we are less sure of who they are and
therefore who we are” (Shepard 1993:289). Presently, the
power of corporate elites within neo-liberal states may
be influencing government decisions as well as how
communities behave and even think. As Casagrande and
Peters (2013) argue, power elite discursively manipulate
cultural models and cognitive dissonance to maintain
power.
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ecology’ view of environment (Naess 2001) where equity
in distribution of natural resources takes precedence
over concerns about survival of those that constitute
these ‘resources’ (Bakker 2010). Thus, environmental an-
thropologists have stressed the importance of recognising
the indigenous and non-European traditions in valuing
nature (Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2011).
Non-Western perspectives
The Principles of Ecological Justice from the First People
of Color Leadership Conference, UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Indigenous Environ-
mental Network, the Bolivian “rights of Mother Nature”
initiative, as well as numerous other declarations on
environmental and climate change issues made by indi-
genous peoples are all examples of representation of
non-Western perspectives on EJ.
Anthropologists have noticed that the idea of humans
as part of nature is paramount to traditional perception
of human-nature relationships. In this view, the under-
standing of the relationships that bind together all forms
of life has been fundamental to the ability of indigenous
peoples to live in spiritual and physical harmony with
the land, passed on through generations. There are a
few intertwined threads that are common in indigenous
vision – that nature is of equal moral status as humans,
that nature has rights, that species are in kinship rela-
tionships with human beings, and that all life is sacred
(e.g. Shiva 1993; Weaver 1996; McGregor 2009; Figueroa
2011; Grossman and Parker 2012; Maldonado et al 2013;
Kopnina and Shoreman-Ouimet 2011; Kopnina 2013a,
2013b, 2013c, 2012e, 2014).
Preston Hardison (2014) has noted that many indigen-
ous peoples work actively against extinction both for the
moral imperative to protect and fulfill their obligations
to their non-human brothers and sisters, and because it
would harm their own identities and human integrity as-
sociated with these relationships. While the master/slave
trope might characterize the industrial society relation-
ship to the environment, indigenous peoples characterize
relationships between humans and non-humans in a
narrative that links reciprocal obligations, in which other
species willingly sacrifice themselves to humans if they
are treated well and with the proper respect. Their role
is to provide for humans, but that is generally taken to
be conditional on their treatment.
Chaudhuri (2012), has argued that the narrative of
human destructiveness is thus balanced with the narra-
tive with one in which humans can play a healing role.
This could be the key to restoring the balance of justice,
provided by the indigenous or minority perspectives, to
addressing justice between all, human and non-human
planetary residents.In examining multiple levels of meaning that inform
Native astronomy and cosmology, Cajete (1994, 2000), a
Native American anthropologist of indigenous learning,
noted that in many traditional societies the transmission
of environmental knowledge is intergenerational. Cajete
reflects that unlike the western scientific method, native
thinking perceives elements of nature as relational.
Questions and conflicts
However, there are also criticisms of this view of tradi-
tional communities living in harmony with nature. Simi-
lar to the representation of the indigenous communities
in the film Avatar, non-Western populations are often
represented as ‘noble savages’. This ideal has given way
to realization that local people have human vices like we
do (Wagley 1976), and recognition that the ‘indigenous
people’ are ‘rarely isolated from global market forces’
(Pountney 2012:215). We need to ask: are these indigen-
ous, non-Western, non-white perspectives not increas-
ingly influenced by global neoliberal vision of the world?
Are they not submerging under the dominant perspec-
tives? Are these non-Western perspectives and ways of
life strong enough? Considering the world’s power he-
gemonies, and daily increases in human population, in
case of conflict between human- environmental inter-
ests, will the ethical considerations not automatically
weigh toward people? How do traditional values map
onto the global patterns of consumption, competition
for resources, increasing cultural homogeneity, commer-
cialization of trade, and above all, the spread of neo-
liberal capitalism?
Also, potential conflict between human and non-
human interests in non-Western countries is in evi-
dence. Sometimes local communities and non-human
interests do correspond and the local communities de-
fend ‘their’ forests and land against the rapacious actions
of logging or mining companies; in other cases they will-
ingly ‘sell out’ the same ‘natural resources’ for profit.
Let us examine the case of the Cambodian anti-
deforestation activist Chut Wutty, the Director of envir-
onmental watchdog Natural Resource Protection Group
(NRPG), who was gunned down by the police while ex-
posing illegal logging activities and land seizures to a
journalist. Wutty spent years exposing how Cambodia’s
corrupt political and business elite have accumulated
vast fortunes by selling off the country’s land and forests
for private gain (The Global Witness 2013).
In Cambodia, land grabs for agricultural development
and logging by private firms, such as Economic Land
Concessions (ELCs) held by agro-industrial companies
by private firms, are common-place (Vrieze and Naren
2012). Conservation International has remained silent
on this issue, refusing even to acknowledge the existence
of logging.
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ber of organizations, including the local authorities but
also large conservation organization, in the case that in-
volved illegal commercial logging, opposing any form of
protest. Milne (2012) commented that the tragic inci-
dent revealed not only the culpability of government of-
ficials who abuse their powers to profit from logging,
but also the hypocrisy of NGOs like Conservation Inter-
national, in order to maintain the façade of effectiveness,
along with their government and donor relationships.
Another case that had tragic results occurred in Janu-
ary 2013, when over one thousand dolphins were slaugh-
tered by the local people on Solomon Island in the
course of a dispute with conservation group, the Earth
Island Institute. Accounts of the dispute vary. In 2012,
the Solomon Islands banned the live export of dolphins.
Before then, the country had been a supplier of live dol-
phins sold to aquariums in China and Dubai, conse-
quently being paid compensation by the conservation
groups to preserve the dolphins (Bennett 2013). The is-
landers say the Berkeley-based conservation group failed
to pay them, as agreed, for stopping the traditional hunt.
The Earth Island Institute says the slaughter was the
work of a “renegade group” trying to sabotage conserva-
tion work, and that community leaders have appropri-
ated the money paid for them (Goldenberg 2013).
What is clear, however, is that a misunderstanding be-
tween the villagers and Earth Island has resulted in one of
the worst cases of dolphin slaughter in the Solomon Islands
for some time, and delivered a huge setback to conserva-
tion efforts in a world “hot spot” for the dolphin trade.
Some critics have blamed conservationists for not paying
local communities enough and causing the slaughter.
Generalising from cases to ethics
Academics defending economic entitlements of local com-
munities against the efforts of conservationists (e.g. Peluso
1993; Wenzel 2009; McElroy 2013) often fail to address the
efficacy of conservation, and the value of non-human lives.
For example, anthropologists such as Einarsson (1993)
and Kalland (2009) have expressed support of whalers’
‘traditional practices’, disregarding the fact that most of the
whalers are no longer involved in traditional practices but
in ‘commercial harvesting’. In a similar vein, addressing the
two cases above, one of my anthropological colleagues has
referred to Chutt Wutty’s death as a tragedy, and to the
slaughter of dolphins as an unfortunate accident.
Some scholars have argued that there are many ways
in which non-human species have been granted a greater
degree of moral standing in post-industrial neo-liberal
societies than was previously the case. The rise of ethical
vegetarianism in the West, the public policies that
protect animal rights and the research demonstrating
greater similarities between humans and nonhumananimals in cognitive and affective processes all suggests
a decrease in the objectification of animals among crit-
ical segments of society (Clayton and Brook 2005).
Western, developed countries exhibit an increased atten-
tion to the importance of green space, and welfare of
plants and animals. In her ethnography of the roadkill
on American roads, Jane Desmond (2013) reflects that
some individuals feel strongly about the subjectivity of
the ‘collateral damage’ of the roadkill.
While there are many testimonials to citizens’ con-
cerns for individual animals or plants, there is no con-
sistent discussion about the scale of instrumental use of
other species, and proportionally insignificant political
representation of advocates for the rights of non-
humans. The scale of human use of animals or plants
has increased exponentially with human population
growth and increase in consumption (Crist 2013). While
the fate of a single rescued dolphin may capture public
attention through the media, there is no consistent dis-
cussion about millions of species ‘harvested’ for con-
sumption, or used for medical experiments. Despite
guilty feelings of a few individuals, cultural prioritizing
of transportation and energy policies place ‘mobility’ and
‘modernity’ before animal welfare (Desmond 2013).
Environmental sociologists Dunlap and Catton (1983)
argued that there is a fundamental problem with the so-
cial science's perception of the place of human beings in
the natural world. The authors described the Human
Exemptionalist Paradigm (HEP), arguing that irrespect-
ive of social scientists’ particular theoretical orientation
(Marxist, functionalist, symbolic interactionist, etc.)
mainstream sociology remained anthropocentric. In
HEP, our acts towards animals are judged on the basis of
how they affect human beings only and not on how they
affect other species (Nibert 2002). View of animals as
culturally, socially or economically significant objects
sees non-humans as facilitators of technological ad-
vancement (e.g. medical experiments or genetic manipu-
lation of plants), as an attribute of cultural practice (e.g.
hunting or whaling), or as the objects of economic
interest (e.g. animal trade), or symbolic ritual (e.g. ani-
mal sacrifice), or collateral damage (e.g. road kill or
forest clearings). Given the fact that biodiversity protec-
tion is not always contingent with economic interests,
and because people can be materially sustained by
monocultures (Crist 2003:65), anthropocentric view of
non-humans leads to the abandonment of species that
are not seen as useful for humanity.
Underlying the range of ethical concerns in regard to
‘nature’ or other species are issues associated with altruism.
The question of altruism
The common-place images of EJ we are all familiar with
often show poor African farmers or starving Indian
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(in terms of exposure to environmental risks and bene-
fits) are recognized as the center of EJ debates, discrim-
ination against individuals within other species or the
entire species is not recognized. Many EJ scholars one-
sidedly focus on the human consequences of environ-
mental injustice while neglecting the issues of justice
that arise from our relations with non-human species.
Ethical considerations often automatically weigh toward
disadvantaged people and not disadvantaged non-human
species. This human-focused view is rooted not just in
social altruism but in ‘the human supremacist mindset
that has enshrined a no-limitation way of life – including
no limitation on reproduction, no limitation on con-
sumption and economic growth’ (Crist 2013:47).
Conservation psychologists have noted that although a
logical distinction can be made between humanistic and
biospheric altruism, not all studies find that people make
this distinction (Dietz et al 2005). People often treat en-
vironmental and ecological altruism as a kind of general-
ized altruism, rather than as two distinct values (Stern et
al 1999). It is thus assumed that those who care about
the environment also care about other people. However,
most studies find that there is significant difference be-
tween human and environment-centered concerns
(Dietz et al 2005:358). Studies have indicated that people
with ecocentric orientation are more likely to act upon
their values in order to protect the environment and that
biospheric altruism centered approach leads to sacrifice
rather than quality-of-life solutions to environmental
problems (Stern et al 1999; Dietz et al 2005).
However, global social altruism is new. Historically
and cross-culturally, we can find many examples (some
from Western societies as recent as a few decades ago)
of how at least some human lives were seen as less im-
portant or worth sacrificing. Many indigenous societies’
practices, ranging from human sacrifice to infant infanti-
cide to control population have now been declared il-
legal. Reification of all human life is part and parcel of
contemporary development politics, findings its echo’s in
Western philosophical and religious traditions of en-
lightenment and individualism, which enshrine an-
thropocentrism (Taylor 2010). Thus, the overwhelming
ethical concern for all humans propagated as the most
common-sense moral basis of post-industrial societies
seems unprecedented in human history. Related to this
unprecedented focus on the value of human life includ-
ing the lives of unborn children – is the increased con-
cern with resources rather than sentient beings. An
unprecedented concern about ‘feeding’ the entire popu-
lation of humans is echoed through declarations of the
United Nations, as well as Western media and public
discourse. Is this a sign that we have moved forward in
our moral development? If so, could the next stage ofour moral development not be the recognition of the
rights of nonhumans? This wide-spread concern about
the health, welfare, human rights, etc. of seven billion
humans seems to grow in reverse proportion to the in-
creasing disregard for billions of plant and animals spe-
cies needed daily to satisfy human needs. Many social
scientists seemed to have accepted as ‘noble’ human
rights, indigenous rights, fighting poverty, preventing
disease, etc. Addressing social and economic ‘challenges
facing our societies’, is very much part of this normative,
neoliberal perspective. In this view, animal rights are
marginal at best, one of many perspectives.
For those who are unable to participate in our learned
academic discussions, it seems that some animals are
much more equal than others. Members of the animal
liberation and radical environmentalists postulate that
exploitation of animals is no different from the exter-
mination of Jews during the Holocaust or slavery
(Guither 1998; Liddick 2006). As is often the case with
revolutions that lead to change in moral regimes, differ-
ent conception of justice is often introduced not by the
oppressed classes (as they might be too oppressed to be
able to struggle) but by the members of elites. As Singer
(1989:148) has stressed, our discrimination against ani-
mals is similar to social discrimination, requiring similar
mental and ethical adjustments as those associated with
human liberation movements:
If we wish to avoid being numbered amongst the
oppressors, we must be prepared to re-think even
our most fundamental attitudes. We need to
consider them from the point of view of those
most disadvantaged by our attitudes, and the practices
that follow from these attitudes. If we can make this
unaccustomed mental switch we may discover a
pattern in our attitudes and practices that consistently
operates so as to benefit one group—usually the one
to which we ourselves belong—at the expense of
another. In this way we may come to see that there is
a case for a new liberation movement. My aim is to
advocate that we make this mental switch in respect
of our attitudes and practices towards a very large
group of beings: members of species other than our
own—or, as we popularly though misleadingly call
them, animals. In other words, I am urging that we
extend to other species the basic principle of equality
that most of us recognize should be extended to all
members of our own species.
Such human advocates like Arno Naess (2001) and
Peter Singer (1989) have proposed the moral basis for
preservation of non-human species, others, like Robyn
Eckersley (1995; 2004) and Brian Baxter (2005), have
linked these rights to debates on justice.
Kopnina Earth Perspectives 2014, 1:8 Page 6 of 11
http://www.earth-perspectives.com/content/1/1/8In A Theory of Ecological Justice, Baxter (2005) links
ecology to standard liberal theories of justice, such as
those found in the work of Rawls and Barry and defends
the claim that all organisms have a claim in justice to a
fair share of the planet's environmental resources. In
quoting Sir Attenborough’s answer to the question
whether it mattered if one small species of snail should
become extinct due to human activities, especially as no
other ecological damage has resulted: ‘surely it is sad in-
deed that our descendants should inherit a natural world
that is more impoverished than the one we inherited?’
(BBC 2000; quoted in Baxter 2005:9), Baxter doubts the
moral validity of this wide-spread argumentation. Baxter
argues that at present concerns about future generations
of human beings tend to undervalue any argument about
the damage done to the snails or any other species:
The possibility of there being any wrong done to the
species of snail or to the individual members of the
species, receives no mention at all…Apparently, it is
only the possible losses to actual and future human
beings, whether aesthetic, cultural, scientific, medical,
economic, recreational and so forth, that count
(Baxter 2005:1).
Baxter argues that the starting point of justice argu-
ments in favour of nature should be nature itself. He
puts forward an argument for accepting that all organ-
isms count, morally-speaking, and not simply those
which human beings like or find useful.
Environmental debates
Biospheric altruism has a different ontology than that of
the history of EJ as a movement, which arose in part as
a response to (or against) the focus of mainstream envir-
onmental advocacy organizations on wilderness and
wildlife conservation concerns, when opponents of con-
servation projects have claimed that indigenous commu-
nities were being denied equitable protection against
serious environmental risks. The argument that EJ, or
environmental ethics more broadly, ought to take into
account the value of non-human organisms and systems
- has entered environmental ethics debates since the
1970s. Environmental ethic included the ideas that value
is mind-independent and exists at several different levels
including those of “higher” animals, organisms, species
and ecosystems (Jamieson 1997).
That approach has since the 1980s been subject to co-
gent critiques from a number of environmental ethicists,
questioning the assertion that current human population
is THE mechanism behind environmental degradation
and disregard for non-human organisms, or, that there is
some causal relationship between these (Norton 1984).
The recent wave of environmental ethicists criticized thepresumed division between either morally limited or
fully integrated egalitarianism and outlined many other
options (Light 2010). These options included a more ro-
bust understanding of justice in terms of obligations to
other moral agents, requiring consent, criticizing de-
fenders of non-human species as builders of the straw
man argument, reducing the human-centered view to a
feeble parody of what a full-throated cry for human
justice might entail.
Eco-Marxist scholar Schnaiberg (1980) argues against
what he terms Malthusian determinism with the ration-
ale that under larger capitalist economies, human deg-
radation moved to organizationally caused degradation
of capitalist political economies and that the global
population growth is not to blame. Schnaiberg provided
the example of the organized degradation of rainforest
areas in which powerful elites push people off the land
before it is degraded by organizational means. Schnai-
berg argued that environmental damage caused by state-
political and labor-supported capitalist expansion may
cause a decline both in the state's funding as well as
worker livelihood, necessitating ecologically benevolent
state action, signifying a turn toward ecological modern-
isation (Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000).
Technological development was proposed as the key
to achieving sustainability. It was thus believed that en-
lightened self-interest, economy and ecology can be fa-
vorably combined and that greater wealth will lead to
the development of postmaterialistist values (Inglehart
1971). Postmaterialistist values theory assumes that
while wealthier societies can ‘afford’ to care about the
environment, the developing countries cannot.
However, empirical evidence of accelerating climate
change, habitat destruction, and species extinction all
testify to the fact that combined forces of population
and consumption growth tend to override any positive
gains promised by scientific and technological advance-
ment (Cafaro and Crist 2012). As publications of Inter-
national Development Research Center suggest, the
development paths of industrialised North are not viable,
despite of technological and social changes. The rich
North is failing to address serious environmental
challenges as well as intensified animal exploitation for
increasing human consumption, as in the case of
CAFO’s, intensive farming. Technological advancement
does nothing to alter the impulses within the capitalist
economic mode of production that inevitably lead to en-
vironmental degradation (Foster 2002) and decrease of
animal welfare, particularly if left to business as usual
(York and Rosa 2003).
This article will not discuss further the differences in
environmental ethics, animal liberation, biospheric egali-
tarianism and related perspectivesa. Despite the richness of
environmental ethics debates, most biocentric, ecocentric,
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of the problem – rapid destruction of habitats, extinction
of species, industrial farming – the point of convergence is
an extension of the moral consideration to animals or habi-
tats. The golden toad (now extinct) and the Sumatran tiger
(critically endangered) do not benefit from the so-called
plurality of perspectives that privileges one species only.
From a practical point of view, Callicott (1988) has argued
for making common cause against a common enemy -the
destructive forces at work ravaging the nonhuman world –
rather ‘than to continue squabbling among ourselves’.
Jamieson (1997) has also argued that animal liberationists
and environmental ethicists share many views, recognising
serious threats to both individual animals as well as to en-
vironment; because animal liberationists can value nature
as a home for sentient beings; and because animal libera-
tionists can embrace environmental values as intensely as
environmental ethicists.
At the plenary session of the 17th World Congress of
the International Union of Anthropological and Ethno-
logical Sciences, in Manchester in August 2013, the mo-
tion ‘Justice for people should come before justice for
the environment’ was debated (http://www.iuaes2013.
org/Plenaries.html). Briefly summed up, the main argu-
ment for the motion centered around the idea that conser-
vationists are mostly Western elites and that their actions
impinge upon cultural practices and economic develop-
ment of local communities. Supporting the motion, Amita
Baviskar and Don Nonini have argued that anthropolo-
gists have a duty to uphold human rights and indigenous
entitlements against Western environmentalists.
The opponents Helen Kopnina and Veronica Strang
have argued that environmentalism is not a Western but
a universal phenomenon, and that love of nature is
shared by many traditional societies. They agreed with
the proponents of the motion that culpability for eco-
logical problems lies largely with corporate and political
elites that perpetuate the neoliberal industrial economy
and commodification of nature. They have pointed out
that ‘cultural practices’ of most societies have now given
way to globalized consumerism. If ecological justice is to
be recognized, both nature and the people will benefit as
humans and environment are intimately interconnected.
Veronica Strang (2013) reflected:
In a world where the most powerful groups live in
wholly unsustainable affluence, it is very difficult to
suggest that anyone should be prevented from
enjoying the immediate material benefits that these
practices allow… However, there remains a thorny
question as to whether anyone, advantaged or
disadvantaged, has the right to prioritise their own
interests to the extent that those of the non-human
are deemed expendable. Discourses on justice forpeople often imply that the most disadvantaged
groups should have special rights to redress long-term
imbalances… However, if the result is only a short-term
gain at the long-term expense of the non-human, this is
in itself not a sustainable process for maintaining either
social or environmental equity.
After the debate and presentations attending members
of the plenary session were asked to vote for or against
the motion. Considerable majority of 90 voted against
the motion. Most participants were thus convinced that
ecological justice needs to be considered as part of EJ.
It was recognized that learning from non-Western per-
spectives, recognizing care, responsibility and intercon-
nectedness could lead to a better stewardship and
guardianship of the world in the long-run (e.g. Hardison
2014).
Implications for justice debates
In a 1972 paper titled “Should Trees Have Standing?”
Christopher D. Stone proposed that if corporations are
assigned rights, so should natural objects such as trees.
The book was a rallying point for the then burgeoning
environmental movement, launching a worldwide debate
on the basic nature of legal rights that reached the U.S.
Supreme Court. Stone (2010) explored the impact his
ideas have had on the American courts, the academy, and
society as a whole. At the heart of the book is a compel-
ling argument why trees and the environment as a whole
should be bestowed with legal rights, so that the voiceless
elements in nature are protected against threats of human
population growth and increase in consumption.
Perhaps the greatest challenge for all theorists of eco-
logical justice is not working out the finer points of the
debate, on which they essentially agree (as most would
argue for some form of animal or biospheric rights and
recognition of some extent of intrinsic value of all beings,
human and non-human), but rather to devise a common
strategy allowing those ‘in power’ (international institu-
tions, policy- makers, consumers, etc.) to recognize the
importance of these basic shared values.
While there is a degree of disagreement whether only
individuals within the species, entire species or the
whole habitats should be valued and to what extent, the
crucial point is that for both deep ecologists or animal
rights advocates ecological justice needs to transcend an-
thropocentrism that makes other species subservient to
human rights and entitlements. The issue here is the
current imbalance between the value of human life in re-
lation to other lives (for example, concerns about being
able to ‘save lives’ through animal testing, or concerns
about ‘feeding the planet’, meaning people only). While
human rights are widely acknowledged in neoliberal
rhetoric, no such acknowledgement is made in regard to
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every day to feed the growing human population, or
billions of mice used for scientific experiments, or thou-
sands of acres of forest cleared for the ever-expanding
agricultural development.
Reconciliation
Compassion originating from emotional identification
with nature leads one to defend the loved objects that
are being violated is common in all cultures (Munro
2001). And here, we can argue, the opportunity for
reconciliation lies. Returning to the Cambodian case, it
is unlikely that mainstream conservation organizations
will ever fulfil the role that Chut Wutty as his life-force
and approach as a leader and eco-warrior was truly
unique, and this must be honoured and sustained by the
Cambodian people (Milne 2012).
In the blog post of Vegans of Color (http://vegansofcolor.
wordpress.com/tag/animal-rights/) this common call is
heard:
If transition away from automobile culture, towards
renewable energies, and towards composting and
water recycling are part of the green movement that
might buy us all more time on the world as we know
it, than veganism – a veganism cognizant of the
human and Earth liberation elements of its
actualization – also must be part of that same
movement. And it has to be about as many of us
humans as possible.
Since we pursue those things which materially and
otherwise most benefit us, as do all other creatures,
then a veganism that appeals to our longevity and the
leveling of the balance of power in human societies
should theoretically find mass appeal. Veganism in
explicit combination with human rights, or veganism
plus human liberation, can be understood as
Liberation Veganism. Liberation Veganism … has its
obvious ethical elements, ecological arguments, and
social justice underpinnings, but as a liberation
movement, it can and must include all the social
capital of successful trends: propaganda, recipes
indigenous to our cultures which veganize palates and
minds from the grassroots, and the revolutionary
gatherings, rallies and potlucks that find ways to
intermix all manner of human rights and liberation
issues with the way we eat. Wider application of this
‘food for thought’ is the idea of justice – and injustice
done to the weaker party, be they local impoverished
populations or felled trees.
Outside of anthropology, the common problem in the
EJ literature is that people of color, people from thedeveloping world, and indigenous peoples’ scholarship
are often omitted from the EJ literature. Yet, perhaps
we could learn from non-Western communities to
recognize the short-sightedness as well as the moral de-
ficiency of prioritizing social or economic justice at
the expense of the non-humans. These non-Western
perspectives teach us that we cannot have justice for
people before justice for the environment, because
separating these will lead to neither. We need to con-
sider justice more broadly, as something that depends
on upholding the simultaneous common good of the
human and the non-human (Strang 2013).
Affirmative action
Without acknowledgement and articulation how some
conflicts—especially between humans and non-humans—
can become a matter of basic survival, any deliberative,
pluralist politics may encounter serious limits (Cannavó
2008). Considering the fact that continuous advocacy and
representation is needed to represent non-humans (who
will never speak for themselves), we need to push justice
debate beyond academic compounds. This might require
much more ‘affirmative action’. As a prominent anthro-
pologist Eugene Anderson (2014) has remarked: ‘Today,
with the world ecosystem crashing around us, we are
going to have to take stands’. If animal life had been
placed on an existential par with human life – or animals
have been recognized as subjects of their lives – then their
exploitation and that of their homelands would have been
rendered morally unfeasible (Crist 2013).
Only after the general public is convinced that
normative-philosophical grounds upon which habitat de-
struction, species extinction, poor treatment of animals
and many other practices stand are morally wrong, can
we expect any kind of positive change to occur. This
change will be profound as it will affect all non-human
species: those that we directly depend on (e.g. consump-
tion), use for companionship, recreation and entertain-
ment (e.g. pets, zoo animals, house plants, parks, etc.)
potentially depend on (e.g. biodiversity, for example cer-
tain medicinal plants for pharmaceutical industry) and
those that we do not depend on (‘left over’ biodiversity).
Such a change would imply that a host of issues ranging
from biodiversity protection to animal rights will need
to be integrated into national laws, the way other forms
of human rights and non-discrimination measures are
currently integrated within national legal systems.
This implies the need to develop a post-racial, post-
gender, post-class, undifferentiated humanity so we can
develop responsibility for other species. It also implies
that EJ framework can provide the solution for environ-
mental conflicts (Müller 2012). If social altruism can
be learned, this has significant implications for the
role of education in fostering biospheric egalitarianism
Kopnina Earth Perspectives 2014, 1:8 Page 9 of 11
http://www.earth-perspectives.com/content/1/1/8(Kopnina 2012a, b). Returning to Baxter (2005) and
Schlosberg (2007), in working out conflicts over justice,
various models of political deliberation among a plurality
of parties, including nonhumans, need to be further con-
sidered. Drawing on both authors’ reflection on delibera-
tive democracy and pluralism, the practical promise of
his approach to justice needs to be further explored.
Conclusion
We have distinguished four types of EJ, with the first
three types concerned with equitable distribution of en-
vironmental burdens and benefits to nations or social
groups in space and time. Presently many EJ scholars
one-sidedly focus on the human consequences of envir-
onmental injustice and neglect the issues of justice that
arise from our relations with non-human species.
The urgency of protecting endangered species or the
treatment of animals in industrial system of food pro-
duction is not likely to be adequately addressed in the
current paradigm. In line with Schlosberg’s thesis, in
order to move forward we need to embrace the notions
of justice based on recognition, capabilities, and partici-
pation in relations between human communities and
non-humans. If the non-humans are to be entitled to a
fair share of essential goods, and their right to ‘flourish’
is recognized, the inclusion of non-humans through eco-
advocates within political systems would be the next step.
The implications of embracing biospheric egalitarianism
as part of EJ are profound. If concerns about non-human
species are to be seriously considered – this will mean a
radical revision of existing justice policies. The expansion
of the moral sphere is likely to depend on a myriad of
socio-cultural ‘butterfly effects’.
It may be said in favour of probability of such a shift
that there is evidence that anthropocentric value orienta-
tion is not universal and that different forms of altruism
can be found in all societies. Given the long history of
evolution of human ethics, the shift towards inclusion of
biospheric egalitarianism within the framework of EJ
seems realistic. The same factors that made gender and
race equality so ‘common-sense’ in the neoliberal societies
could be responsible for the shift towards new planetary
ethics.
The author is hopeful about the possibility of such a
shift. Just as one day slavery has become intolerable, per-
haps one day the subordination of non-human species
will become unacceptable. And what is a day or even a
century in the course of human moral history? After all,
what we have to gain is the greater harmony between all
those who belong to this planet.
Endnote
aEnvironmental ethics hosts a lot of debates about
what type of approach should be used for advancingecological justice or animal rights. For example, while
Peter Singer proposes utilitarian approach to animal
rights, Nussbaum and Sunstein (2004) argues that utili-
tarian approach to animals ignores adaptive preferences,
elides the separateness of distinct persons, misidentifies
valuable human/non-human emotions, and calculates
according to “sum-rankings” rather than inviolable pro-
tection of intrinsic entitlements. As the recent develop-
ments of the capabilities approach also include the
discussion of the wider biosphere, Nussbaum advocates
the capabilities approach is a set of political principles as
a framework for human obligations towards other spe-
cies. To this end, the capabilities approach, similar to
previous application to the case of women’s rights, the
notion of justice for non-human species is based on dig-
nity and Aristotelian notions of flourishing. Based on
this approach, Nussbaum (2009) advocates including an-
imals and nature in the “frontiers”, or the previously
marginal fields, into common liberal justice theories.
Singer has retorted however that if we define “flourish-
ing” in a biological sense that Nussbaum’s use of terms
like “flourishing” blends the boundary between facts and
values and that Nussbaum owes us an account of which
capabilities she thinks important and good, and why
(Singer 2002).
Another example of environmental ethics debate is be-
tween Callicott (1980, 1999) and Jamieson (1997), based
on Callicott’s essay ‘Triangular Affair’ leading to an in-
creasingly acrimonious divorce between individualistic
animal welfare ethics and holistic ecocentric ethics’. In
this essay Callicott (1980) claimed that environmental
ethics and animal liberation are conceptually distinct,
and that animal liberation has more in common with
conventional morality than with environmental ethics.
Jamieson (1997) has argued however that animal libera-
tionists can hold many of the same normative views as
environmental ethicists.
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